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
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**DEFINING U.S. FORWARD PRESENCE  
IN EUROPE:  
GETTING PAST THE NUMBERS**

**William T. Johnsen  
Thomas-Durell Young**



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188									
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS											
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT											
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		Approved for public release; distribution unlimited											
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)  ACN 92038		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)											
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Strategic Studies Institute	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCI	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION											
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)  U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Bks Carlisle, PA 17013-5050		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)											
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER											
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS  PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.      PROJECT NO.      TASK NO.      WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.											
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Defining U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers (U)													
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Johnsen, William T.; Young, Thomas-Durell													
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 92/07/20	15. PAGE COUNT 29										
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION													
17. COSATI CODES <table border="1"><tr><th>FIELD</th><th>GROUP</th><th>SUB-GROUP</th></tr><tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr><tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr></table>		FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP							18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) U.S. military presence; forward deployed; Europe; force structure options; personnel strength; National Command Authority		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP											
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The rationale for this report has been to fill a noticeable void in the debate of the future of U.S. military presence in Europe. Heretofore, much attention has been directed toward discussions of personnel vice ascertaining future missions and types of forces that will be needed. The authors attempt to identify key capabilities that will be required of future U.S. Army forces in Europe. Additionally, they posit potential force structure options should personnel strengths in Europe be reduced below currently anticipated levels. The exact number of U.S. Army personnel that will remain in Europe is a decision that will be made by the National Command Authority, in close consultation with Congress. However, Army leadership must be prepared to present what capabilities the Army requires in this theater in order to carry out its directed missions.													
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified											
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Marianne P. Cowling		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3234	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCI										

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**William T. Johnsen  
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**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTION**

**July 20, 1992**

**92-25616**

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## FOREWORD

The important changes that have transpired in European security since the end of the cold war have and will continue to have a noticeable effect upon the future structure of U.S. Army forces forward deployed in Europe. To date, the political debate over the future U.S. presence in Europe has concentrated on the number of personnel to be deployed in that theater, as opposed to discerning what missions the U.S. Army will need to perform in the future. The authors of this report argue that such an approach stands the strategic process on its head. Instead, the debate should focus, as the Army has long maintained, first on the capabilities required of U.S. forces in Europe, and then address the numbers of personnel that will be needed to support those capabilities.

The authors attempt to identify the key capabilities that will be required of future U.S. Army forces in Europe. Additionally, they posit potential force structure options should personnel strengths in Europe be reduced below currently anticipated levels.

Of course, in the final analysis, the exact number of U.S. Army personnel that will remain in Europe is a decision that will be made by the National Command Authority, in close consultation with Congress. However, it is incumbent upon the Army leadership to be prepared to present what capabilities the Army needs to maintain in theater after 1995 to be able to carry out its directed missions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the future of the U.S. Army in Europe.



KARL W. ROBINSON  
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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS**

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## **DEFINING U.S. FORWARD PRESENCE IN EUROPE: GETTING PAST THE NUMBERS**

Despite the massive changes brought on by the end of the cold war, U.S. vital interests throughout the world remain largely constant. Nowhere is this more true than in Europe, where the metamorphosis in that region's security environment has been dramatic. To cope with these altered conditions in regional security, while protecting vital interests, NATO and U.S. strategy have changed profoundly.<sup>1</sup> For the Atlantic Alliance, increased attention is now focused on forward presence, crisis management, rapid reaction forces, and multinational formations, and away from "Flexible Response" and "Forward Defense." U.S. national strategy will continue to rely ultimately on nuclear deterrence, but in the conventional arena will parallel NATO's strategy and shift toward reduced forward presence, improved crisis response capabilities, and reconstitution, as well as a smaller, restructured residual force.<sup>2</sup>

Ascertaining what will constitute "forward presence" lies, perhaps, at the crux of the new National Security Strategy, for the level of forward presence largely dictates the scope of the remaining elements of the strategy; i.e., size of contingency forces based in the continental United States (CONUS) needed for crisis response, reinforcement capabilities, mix of the active and reserve components, and reconstitution. Because Europe remains the region most vital to U.S. national interests, the question of the U.S. military presence there is a matter of no small consequence.

That a U.S. military presence is needed in Europe for the foreseeable future is generally accepted in both Europe and the United States. Many key leaders in Europe remain convinced that a U.S. military presence (of some undefined size) is a *sine qua non* for continued stability on the "Old Continent" and are actively lobbying for retention of U.S.

military forces. The Bush Administration has acknowledged the concerns of U.S. allies, as well as the strategic importance of Europe to the United States, and has argued vigorously for a continued significant U.S. presence in the region. Nor is this key point lost on the loyal opposition. Democratic presidential hopeful Governor Bill Clinton is also on record supporting a sizeable continued U.S. military presence in Europe.<sup>3</sup>

But, the eventual size of the U.S. forward presence in Europe has yet to be established and is the subject of an increasingly intense debate. To contribute positively to the current debate over forward presence, therefore, this report will attempt, first, to review briefly the current definition of forward presence in Europe; second, to discuss the general capabilities required of U.S. forces in Europe under the new security conditions; third, to redefine more clearly forward presence in Europe; and, fourth, to provide options for future force structures in Europe to support forward presence. This report is limited the U.S. Army in Europe, for, in the final analysis, the physical presence of land power (*vice* air or maritime) will provide the greatest symbolic credibility to our European allies and potential foes.

### **U.S. Forward Presence in Europe as Currently Defined.**

The *National Military Strategy of the United States* defines forward presence as "...forces stationed overseas and afloat...periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts."<sup>4</sup> Because of this rather all-encompassing description, forward presence currently has the unavoidable characteristic of being all things to all people.

For example, the Bush Administration has proposed a force of 150,000 to remain in Europe, while Democratic presidential hopeful and former Governor of California, Jerry Brown, has (flippantly, perhaps) suggested that a residual force of 1,000 would be sufficient.<sup>5</sup> Such divergent numbers obviously represent opposing poles of the debate. But determining which pole will exert the stronger attraction is a critical question. Key

congressional leaders, for example, have indicated potential support for numbers well below the administration's position (i.e., 50,000 to 75,000).<sup>6</sup>

Because the credibility of U.S. forward presence depends upon perceptions (of both friends and potential foes), it may not be appropriate to define forward presence categorically as being tied to some arbitrary number of personnel to be stationed in Europe. Whether, in its national debate, the United States finally decides to finance 1,000 or 75,000 or 150,000 troops stationed in Europe may be the critical issue because numbers take on a symbolic importance of their own. That said, it is important to refocus on the identification of the capabilities required of residual U.S. forces in Europe and how those forces are structured, stationed, and incorporated into NATO's future multinational forces to support U.S. national security strategy. For, only by ensuring the full integration of ends, ways, and means (instead of standing the strategic process on its head by concentrating first on means and then adapting ways and ends) can the future U.S. military presence in Europe best insure U.S. national interests in the region.

### **Capabilities Required.**

Before delving into the discussion of the capabilities required of a U.S. military presence in Europe after 1994, it must be understood that forward presence does not lend itself to simple, linear analysis. Rather, forward presence is linked to a complex set of factors, each of which consists of a number of dependent variables, all of which must remain in balance. In analyzing and assessing potential elements of future U.S. forward presence in Europe, it is essential to keep these many linkages in mind and assess the various options in light of possible combinations and potential outcomes.

The ability to determine the capabilities required of a future U.S. forward presence in Europe is complicated further by the perceived absence of a significant threat. In the past, U.S. forward presence was easily defined against a distinct and measurable threat. That no longer exists, and, while "instability" in a generic sense may pose risks, it does not lend

itself to detailed threat-based force planning. The basis for the future U.S. forward presence cannot, therefore, be focused solely on potential threats. Instead, analysis must look beyond the search for the "right" number of U.S. personnel and concentrate on the capabilities needed to ensure the ability to execute effective military operations, if required.

In determining required capabilities, the U.S. residual presence in Europe must, first and foremost, retain the ability to contribute to the defense of our allies in accordance with U.S. obligations to NATO.<sup>7</sup> Second, residual forces must manifest Washington's continued political commitment to Europe and assure our NATO allies that Washington remains *militarily* committed to their future security.<sup>8</sup>

While the second capability is clearly a political, as opposed to strictly military, requirement, the two issues are closely intertwined and, therefore, the political necessity must be translated into military structures. On the one hand, the magnitude of the future force in Europe could be defined solely as a function of budget allocations: the current numbers oriented debate. On the other hand, such an approach may not suffice because it could fail to satisfy either our allies' perceptions of what constitutes a credible presence, or pass the test of military sufficiency.

*Combat Capabilities.* To be credible, either to our allies or our own military commanders, the future U.S. military presence in Europe must have a certain level of combat capabilities. In other words, planning should be based on the assumption that these forces will be capable of performing military operations, as opposed to fulfilling strictly custodial functions. Said military operations have yet to be defined in any detail, but the new U.S. national and military strategies and NATO's new strategic concept do provide a broad range of missions for U.S. military forces in Europe that can be used to deduce requisite capabilities.

For example, under the new NATO and U.S. national strategies, crisis management and response across the breadth of the Alliance will take on greater importance. U.S. forces remaining in Europe after 1995 must, therefore, be

capable of contributing to NATO's Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, as well as possible operations in support of U.S. national commitments, either individually or as part of an *ad hoc* coalition. In the first case, the United States remains committed to its long-standing contribution to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to NATO's Immediate Reaction Forces and has indicated (but not yet committed) a division sized contribution to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.<sup>9</sup> The extent of the U.S. contribution in the latter two cases would, of course, be dictated by the circumstances of the individual case, but could require commitment of a large share of the U.S. military presence in Europe.<sup>10</sup> The United States also has acknowledged the requirement to contribute to the main defense forces of the Alliance. At the moment, the U.S. presence is concentrated in the Central Region of Allied Command Europe and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the United States committed itself to participate in main defense multinational corps within the Central Region. Based on current U.S. assurances, the U.S. Army must maintain, at the very least, one corps headquarters with one U.S. division to participate with a German division within a U.S.-led multinational corps. An appropriate level of corps troops to support this formation is also required. The United States must also provide one division to a German-led multinational corps. When considered with the intention of the United States to contribute a division to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, this equates to a total commitment of three divisions. However, indications are that only two divisions will be stationed in Europe.<sup>12</sup>

*Force Structures.* The eventual force structure of the future U.S. Army forward military presence in Central Europe needed to fulfill these capabilities will depend on the interaction of a number of issues: the nature of perceived risks, forces required by commitments to support rapid reaction forces, the amount of time available for reinforcement, and strategic lift capabilities. Obviously, if the United States faces a low risk environment, needs few rapid reaction forces, has adequate warning time, and has access to sufficient strategic lift assets, then a smaller forward presence in Europe would be

acceptable. Whether these circumstances will occur remains to be seen.<sup>13</sup>

The calculus of these interactive requirements becomes much more complicated outside the Central Region and its highly modern force structures, developed infrastructure, and long-standing host nation agreements, all of which have been extensively exercised. And, because of the low likelihood of being able to establish a significant level of U.S. military ground force presence on the flanks of NATO,<sup>14</sup> units stationed in Central Europe must possess the capability to deploy to either Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (e.g., North Norway) or the Southern Region (AFSOUTH) to reinforce those vital areas in a time of crisis.

*Deployability.* Units remaining in the Central Region, therefore, must be configured to be capable of rapid transfer to the flanks (which have less developed infrastructure and will require introduction of considerably greater levels of combat support and combat service support capabilities). Additionally, these forces must be prepared to meet a broad range of potential risks and operate on terrain decidedly different from that in Central Europe. Such conditions will require a more robust and, therefore, larger presence than might be required if forces were focused only on the Central European Plain.

The residual U.S. military presence in Europe must also be prepared for operations outside the NATO area, either in support of NATO or as part of an *ad hoc* coalition. Moreover, in a future of constrained resources and reduced force structures, these forces may be called upon to support U.S. national interests outside of Europe more frequently.<sup>15</sup>

Such operations may place considerable demands on European-based forces. Although analogous to reinforcement of the flanks, out-of-area operations are not identical. For example, under the envisaged National Security Strategy, the United States will engage in *ad hoc* coalitions, which by definition, may lack the long-term, peacetime, day-to-day coordination and cooperation that exists within NATO. Under certain circumstances, U.S. forces could rely on substantial allied logistical support, extensive NATO infrastructure, and

alliance experience in large-scale strategic movements that could, in turn, require a lesser U.S. commitment of personnel and resources.

*In-Theater Infrastructure.* In other cases, where the United States might operate outside of NATO's aegis or in areas where extensive infrastructure support might not be available, U.S. military forces in Europe must possess sufficient combat support and combat service support capabilities to sustain themselves during extended operations. Such possibilities would require U.S. forces in Europe to maintain higher levels of combat support and combat service support personnel, units, and equipment than might be required solely to support operations in the Central Region where the United States could rely on a highly developed infrastructure and considerable host nation support.<sup>16</sup> Should numbers of personnel fall below certain levels, the United States may find itself in the difficult position of deciding which national obligations will be met, i.e., combat versus reinforcement capabilities.

The U.S. military presence in Europe must also be capable of receiving, integrating, and supporting augmentation forces from North America, i.e., "contingency forces" from CONUS.<sup>17</sup> This requirement will mean that a continued U.S. military presence in Europe must support the long-standing U.S. reinforcement commitment to the Central Region, as well as improved capabilities to perform similar operations on the periphery of NATO. Moreover, the U.S. military presence must be prepared to receive and forward reinforcements to theaters of operation outside the NATO area either in support of NATO or as part of an *ad hoc* coalition.<sup>18</sup> But, contrary to past planning for reinforcing the Central Region with its extensive infrastructure and host nation support arrangements, reinforcement of the flanks will be decidedly more difficult because of the absence of such in-place support.

The ability to receive and integrate reinforcements along the far flung edges of the Atlantic Alliance may require a commitment of personnel and resources in peacetime to coordinate and support the potential introduction of augmentation forces. Although the numbers of personnel in individual headquarters and organizations may be relatively

small, total numbers may not be inconsequential. In sum, many of the reinforcement responsibilities of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army, and 21st Theater Army Area Command (21st TAACOM), for example, will remain. Thus, while fewer residual forces in Europe and reduced reinforcement requirements will make acceptable a smaller, leaner support structure in Europe, the requirement to maintain such capabilities will remain for the foreseeable future. The eventual size of that support structure will depend upon the ultimate mix of the U.S. forward presence and reinforcements envisaged from CONUS.

*Headquarters Staffs.* Related to the retention of forward based U.S. forces in Europe is the sensitive and important issue of the residual U.S. Army command structure and rank of individuals filling command billets in Europe. For many European policy makers, the ranks of these individuals represent a manifestation of the U.S. commitment to Europe. Consequently, a reduced presence of U.S. general officers in key, highly visible billets may be perceived as an indication of reduced U.S. interest. Granted, in view of the reductions anticipated in U.S. Army forces in Europe, a comparable contraction in general officer positions will occur. But, the administration and the U.S. Army should carefully examine which posts should be eliminated or downgraded and which should be retained as highly visible expressions of U.S. commitment. For example, for policy reasons, the United States may wish to retain an Army four-star general officer billet because of the requirement to interact with international officers of that rank.

On the other hand, because of the scale of reductions contemplated, some might argue that the responsibilities of the remaining corps commander could be extended to all U.S. Army forces in Europe. Such an option is not considered desirable. The corps commander will be fully committed to commanding his peacetime U.S., and wartime multinational, corps. Similarly, the reinforcement responsibilities, and requirements to support the U.S. corps and divisions, as well as units at corps and echelons above corps, will fully occupy the Commander, 21st Theater Army Area Command

(TAACOM, or whatever its successor organization may be designated). Moreover, logistics and administrative support (in both time of peace or conflict) at the theater army level will still be required. Anticipated conditions argue, therefore, for retention of Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Certainly, the size and structure of Headquarters, USAREUR will be modified to conform to changed conditions.

Although some headquarters in Europe will be eliminated and manning levels reduced in remaining staffs, the requirement will still exist for the U.S. Army to provide personnel for these activities. This will include U.S. national, as well as international staffs. At the same time, new headquarters are being established in NATO, e.g., ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, main defense multinational corps headquarters, that will require U.S. participation. Indeed, one should not depreciate the number of personnel required for these assignments. In view of the force levels anticipated, one can expect tension between the competing requirements to man these staffs and, at the same time, man the requisite U.S. combat, combat support and combat service support forces forward deployed in Europe.

*New Missions to the East.* In addition to its responsibilities to its NATO allies, the United States may desire to extend military contacts with the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe. The end of the cold war and the emergence of democratic governments in Eastern and Central Europe present the opportunity for the United States to encourage the creation of democratically-responsive civil-military relations in these former Communist states. Indeed, ongoing, but heretofore limited, military-to-military contacts have indicated a number of areas where Western military experts can contribute to the creation of new military forces responsive to democratic governments.<sup>19</sup> A requirement may emerge, therefore, to establish and sustain more substantial cooperative military-to-military relationships with the newly democratic Central and Eastern European states.

Depending upon the level of U.S. Government commitment to such activities, the numbers of U.S. personnel involved

could vary considerably. At the very least, if we are to be successful, increased liaison teams, attaches, offices of defense cooperation, etc., may have to be created or expanded. A larger commitment, for example the establishment of organizations along the lines of Joint U.S. Military Assistance Groups (JUSMAGs) throughout Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, could entail a considerable number of personnel. Finally, while the numbers in each country may not be consequential, the total effort, especially when combined with the many other functions in Europe, e.g., U.S. and allied headquarters and TAACOM activities, could reduce the personnel available for combat forces.

### **Force Structure Options.**

Before laying out some of the potential options available to U.S. planners, one must reinforce the point that this discussion will not seek to identify the illusive "number" of U.S. personnel which are to eventually remain in Europe. Instead, the focus should be on developing a force structure that provides the necessary capabilities to fulfill the missions required of that forward presence. Under such an approach, a much broader range of options are then available to policy makers. At the same time, a focus on ensuring requisite capabilities assures our allies of a stronger U.S. commitment to European security.

*Commitments.* As indicated earlier, the United States is committed to participation in multinational forces. As currently articulated, the U.S. Army must maintain one corps headquarters with one U.S. division and appropriate levels of corps troops to participate with a German division within a U.S.-led multinational corps. The United States must also provide one division to serve in a German-led multinational corps. Either of the two divisions could be called upon to participate in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. These commitments establish the skeleton of our forward presence—a "corps" sized formation remaining in Europe.

*Defining the "Corps."* The organization of a corps is currently being redefined, particularly within the Central

Region where the "corps" has long been recognized as the "coin of the realm" of an army's force structure. For example, NATO is moving toward creating multinational corps where national contributions will be at the division and brigade level. However, U.S. Army doctrine is currently under revision and it is not clear that the current definition of the corps (i.e., based on divisions) will be retained. Indeed, participation in the doctrinal discussions ("AirLand Operations")<sup>20</sup> argue for a move toward a corps based proportionally more upon brigade structures. Thus, in addition to different definitions of what constitutes a "corps" in Europe, the "Capable Corps" as currently envisaged may not be necessary to provide reassurance to our allies. Over time, therefore, and in an era of both reduced risks and national force structures in Europe, smaller formations may provide a new base line for credibility.

Even within such new parameters, the eventual size and composition of that "corps" could vary considerably. Indeed, the permutations of the composition of the divisions and corps are nearly inexhaustible. For example, in the face of the past threat, particularly in Central Europe, complete units were needed to demonstrate national resolve and credibility. In the future, a similar level of commitment may be possible without the physical presence of entire units in Europe. Given the warning times anticipated in Central Europe, it may be possible to introduce large-scale reinforcements from CONUS within times anticipated. Such conditions could allow for a smaller physical presence of combat forces in Europe (e.g., one or two maneuver brigades per division flag, as well as appropriate corps "slice"), and minimal troops needed to ensure rapid reinforcement to flesh out the corps during a period of increasing tensions.

*Reinforcement.* The ability to introduce large-scale reinforcements rapidly into Europe obviously depends upon balancing a variety of factors: the degree of accepted risk; available warning and reaction times; levels of personnel and facilities to receive, forward, and integrate reinforcements, and prepositioned equipment. Here, the importance of U.S. equipment held in Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) cannot be overlooked.

Designed to meet the requirements of reinforcing Europe in the face of the cold war threat, substantial amounts of equipment stocks have been built up in Central Europe. This equipment could obviously facilitate rapid reinforcement from CONUS and, therefore, make the U.S. commitment to reinforce Europe more credible to both allies and potential foes. More importantly, perhaps, POMCUS stocks and the personnel required to maintain them provide a physical manifestation of U.S. commitments to European security. The continued maintenance of adequate POMCUS facilities and stocks in Europe to support anticipated levels of reinforcement should, therefore, remain a goal of U.S. policy.

At the same time, U.S. POMCUS stocks will allow the United States to maintain roughly equivalent force generation capabilities with its major allies. Again, this may not be as difficult as it first appears. For example, the *Bundeswehr* is to shrink to a peacetime strength of 370,000, with a potential to mobilize to 900,000 during wartime, and the brigade and divisional force structures of the German Army will be split almost equally between active and mobilization-dependent formations.<sup>21</sup> The United States could maintain a smaller physical presence in Europe and still possess force generation capabilities equivalent to our allies.<sup>22</sup>

There are, however, at least two risks inherent in relying too heavily on reinforcing forces at the expense of in-place units. First, while units may be withdrawn from Europe, there is no guarantee that they will be available for future reinforcement of Europe. Given fiscal constraints and recent historical example, it is likely that many units withdrawn from Europe will be eliminated from the U.S. Army's overall force structure.<sup>23</sup> Units withdrawn from Europe and eliminated from the force structure cast a shadow of doubt over U.S. reinforcement capabilities, and, hence, over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security.

Second, a point may be reached where the level of residual forces in Europe no longer represents a credible level of commitment in the eyes of our European allies or potential foes. Where this number lies cannot be known at this time and, undoubtedly, will be the subject of considerable debate.<sup>24</sup> But,

in that debate the United States must not decide alone. At reduced levels of forces in Europe, the United States will no longer be able to make what may be perceived as unilateral decisions. It will be important for the United States to consult its European allies and understand what the members of the Alliance perceive to be a credible U.S. contribution—both politically and militarily.

*Rotations.* A further means of putting flesh on the skeleton is for units from CONUS to rotate periodically to Europe and operate under the command and control of their parent units in Europe. Units could also deploy to Europe for the purpose of exercising with their forward deployed parent unit, as well as to gain familiarity with terrain and allied militaries.<sup>25</sup> While a potential option, the associated costs of transporting units to and from Europe are not inconsiderable and must be recognized. For example, to maintain a 6-month brigade-sized rotation may require as many as three brigades in the force structure.<sup>26</sup> However, in declining defense budgets, funds simply may not be available to support such a deployment scheme. Finally, human costs must be taken into account. Frequent or lengthy rotations to Europe can have adverse effects upon morale. Any reductions in deployment schedules or significant cancellations may cast doubt on the credibility of our commitment.

*A More Reduced Forward Presence.* Another option is simply to have a smaller skeleton. For example, the United States would commit itself solely to the leadership of one multinational corps in Europe, with one division and, importantly, all of the corps assets (combat, combat support, and combat service support) to sustain the corps. Such an option would result in substantial economies, but could, however, call into question Washington's political and military commitment. Moreover, the U.S. Army would be providing a substantial and expensive element of its overall force structure, an entire corps' combat, combat support and combat service support, to support one U.S. division. On the other hand, such a commitment could also indicate considerable support for the multinational concept. As a means of further demonstrating U.S. resolve, provisions could be made, given

adequate finances, to reinforce the corps with an additional armored/mechanized division from CONUS during a time of increasing tension.

The political costs of such an option could be substantial. First, allies may question the U.S. commitment to regional stability and security. Second, Bonn would surely oppose the lack of reciprocity in U.S. participation in multinational corps, i.e., subordination of a German Army division to a U.S. corps, without provision for a U.S. division serving under a German Army corps.<sup>27</sup> Third, the German-led "multinational" corps would no longer be multinational. As other nations are already fully committed to other multinational corps, the only potential participant nation is France. In view of the controversy surrounding the fall 1991 Franco-German initiative to create a European Corps,<sup>28</sup> and the fact that France still refuses to serve within the integrated military structure of NATO, such an option is probably not in U.S. interests. Finally, U.S. participation in a German-led multinational corps could be essential for continued political support for the *Bundeswehr*'s maintenance of an active force of 370,000.

*The Gordian Knot.* Finally, the U.S. Army may eventually find itself at force levels where it is unable simultaneously to sustain an effective combat force and adequate reinforcement potential in Europe. Where that particular number falls is unknown and it may not be reached for a considerable time, but it will certainly require considerable analysis. Eventually, however, a point may be reached where the senior leadership of the U.S. Army must approach the administration to ascertain which mission has priority: in-theater combat capability or reinforcement.<sup>29</sup> Equally important, the United States must seek guidance from its European allies concerning their expectations of types and levels of U.S. forces.

When these decisions are considered, we recommend that the U.S. Army focus on reinforcement capability at the expense of forward deployed combat forces. The rationale behind this alternative is three-fold. First, our European allies will view a strong U.S. reinforcement capability as an expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. Second, and perhaps more important from a U.S. Army standpoint, rapid reinforcement capability is

what will permit the establishment of a combat capable corps structure in Europe. Third, such reinforcement capability may be required for out-of-NATO-area operations.

Should a decision be made to retain predominantly the reinforcement option, the capability to carry out that mission must be assiduously safeguarded, for the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe will be measured against that capability. However, given the reduced force levels in Europe that some anticipate, it may be unreasonable to assume that whatever remains of 21st TAACOM will be capable of providing the level of support needed for such operations, unless augmented from CONUS.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, should 21st TAACOM be directed to maintain a full capability on the ground in Europe, a conscious decision may be required on the trade-offs between combat forces and combat support. For, in the constrained fiscal environment (and finite numbers of authorized personnel) the U.S. Army will likely face in Europe after 1995, there may not be sufficient forces to perform all missions equally well. And, a decision to increase the capabilities of the reinforcing mission may result in a decrease of the number of spaces available for combat force structure.

This conclusion does not imply, however, that the current levels of theater support in Europe cannot be adjusted. At present, there is considerable reinforcement infrastructure in Europe, based on the long-held premise of deploying 10 divisions in 10 days to Europe. Given anticipated risks in that region, it is likely that both the number of divisions will be reduced and reinforcement time extended. These conditions should permit existing capabilities to be rationalized and responsibilities shared between the United States and host nations. Moreover, given this new security environment, now is the time to approach our European allies with a view to expanding host nation support arrangements in order to maintain adequate reinforcement capabilities, but at lower financial costs to the United States.<sup>31</sup>

## **Conclusions.**

The U.S. Government is clearly committed to providing a credible forward presence in support of its security obligations in Europe. Supporting that commitment will fall most heavily on the U.S. Army, for, in the final analysis, land power will provide the greatest symbolic credibility. As currently articulated by the Bush Administration, this commitment will be manifested by the U.S. Army through the presence of a corps headquarters, two divisions, the requisite corps troops to support operations of a combat capable corps, and the ability to execute large-scale reinforcement of Europe. At the same time, the Bush Administration has advocated a forward presence of roughly 92,000 personnel in Europe to man the skeletal force structure in a manner that would ensure a combat capable corps, and, hence, provide a credible commitment to friends and potential foes, alike.

Equally possible, however, is that future fiscal and political events in the United States could make the attainment of such personnel figures highly unlikely in the long term. In short, therefore, sacrifices may have to be made and it is incumbent on the U.S. Army to begin planning now for such a possibility. Moreover, a potential gap between force structure requirements and personnel authorizations could cast a shadow over the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European security and, therefore, adversely affect U.S. political influence. Therefore, in designing the future U.S. forward presence in Europe, it is crucial that the U.S. Army not focus attention simply on numbers. Far more important is the requirement to identify *capabilities* that will convince our allies of the U.S. commitment to European security and, then, to adjust the numbers to ensure those capabilities.

A delicate balance will have to be maintained between combat forces and personnel needed to facilitate theater reinforcement from CONUS, as well as combat support and combat service support units needed at echelons above corps for sustained combat operations to ensure that all required capabilities can be executed. A time may arrive, however, when U.S. personnel levels may not be capable of effectively

carrying out all missions. When this point is reached, U.S. forward presence in Europe should focus on the reinforcement mission. For, it is the ability of the United States to reinforce rapidly and to establish a credible combat force that contributes most to a credible U.S. forward presence. Moreover, reinforcement infrastructure takes longer to rebuild and, therefore, represents a clearer commitment to European defense. Again, the numbers required to perform these missions will vary and will depend on the dynamic balance between residual combat force potential and reinforcement requirements.

### **Recommendations.**

- Greater attention needs to be focused on establishing the residual capabilities required of the future U.S. Army presence in Europe, *vice* absolute numbers of individuals forward deployed, as is currently the case in the on-going political debates. In short, ways and means must be fully integrated, rather than means driving the process.
- Irrespective of the eventual size of the residual U.S. presence in Europe, a balanced force structure of all three services will be needed to provide a credible presence in the eyes of European allies, as well as potential foes.
- Within the U.S. Army commitment to Europe, a similar balance must be maintained between warfighting capabilities and reinforcement and sustainability requirements.
- Should personnel numbers fall to levels incapable of sustaining such a balance, priority should be given to reinforcement and sustainability, as these capabilities represent a fuller expression of the U.S. commitment to our European allies. The United States:
  - must maintain sufficient elements of the existing infrastructure in Europe, to include personnel, that

will permit reinforcement options at levels currently envisaged; and,

- should negotiate for increased host nation support for these capabilities.
- In designing the residual warfighting structure, innumerable options are available. That said, the following represent the minimal capabilities required:
  - a corps headquarters/planning staff to command the U.S.-led multinational corps in AFCENT;
  - sufficient corps troops to support peacetime operations, to provide adequate combat support and combat service support during conflict, and to facilitate rapid reinforcement;
  - two U.S. division headquarters/planning staffs; one for service in the U.S.-led corps, the second to participate in the German-led corps to which the United States has committed;
  - the exact composition of the two divisions and corps troops can vary substantially, depending upon the numbers of personnel available. Again, focus should be on retaining key capabilities, *vice* pure numbers of personnel;
  - one of the two divisions could also fill the U.S. role in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; and,
  - sufficient personnel and infrastructure to integrate CONUS-based reinforcements into operational plans and structures upon arrival in theater.
- The percentage of U.S. participation in the numerous NATO and international headquarters should be maintained.
- While U.S. headquarters in Europe will undoubtedly be reduced, and some eliminated, a certain level of peacetime command and control headquarters and organizations will still be required (e.g., USEUCOM). Additionally, theater army support capabilities must be

sufficient to support envisaged operations. Moreover, these organizations must be capable of being augmented and making the transition to a war headquarters, if required.

- Additional personnel may be required to initiate and sustain military-to-military contacts with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Given existing, and potential for expanded, cooperation, substantial numbers of personnel may be required. Also, the level of participation by the individual states, and the decision of what form of permanent cooperative relationship will exist, may require the establishment of some form of joint military advisory group structure.

## ENDNOTES

1. See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991; *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991; and *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992.

2. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, pp. 25-31; and *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, pp. 6-8.

3. Apropos the issue of the desire of all of America's allies in NATO for the United States to retain forces in Europe, the reaction by European governments following President Bush's challenge to his colleagues at the Rome NATO Summit concerning the objective of European defense is instructive. See comments of Jean Musitelli, spokesman for French President Francois Mitterrand, *The Washington Post*, November 8, 1991. For more recent declarations see the activities of Britain's Ambassador to the United States, in James Adams Washington, "Rebel Allies Flex Muscles as Britain Tries to Save NATO," *Sunday Times* (London), May 10, 1992, p. 18; or Stanley Meisler, "Kohl to U.S.: Keep Troops in Europe," *Los Angeles Times* (Washington edition), May 6, 1992, p. 2. Governor Clinton's position is not specific, but calls for fewer U.S. forces in Europe than proposed by the Bush Administration. See *Army Times*, March 23, 1992, pp. 12-13.

4. *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, p. 7.

5. In all fairness, it must be recognized that the Bush Administration figures are based on the assessment that the United States needs to retain a robust Army corps (to include corps headquarters, corps troops, and two divisions), supplemented by appropriate levels of air forces (currently 3 wings, or approximately 200-225 combat aircraft), maritime forces, and rapid reinforcement capability, combat capable U.S. Army corps, supplemented by appropriate air and maritime forces. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 27 and *National Military Strategy of the United States*, pp. 20-21. The argument here is whether the number of 150,000 personnel in Europe stipulated as necessary to provide such a forward presence is sustainable in today's fiscal environment.

6. For example, at the *Wehrkunde* Conference in Munich in February 1992, key congressional leaders indicated force levels of this size. See Marc Fisher, "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolationism," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1992, p. A1.

7. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

8. Concomitantly, it should be noted, such a U.S. presence may provide limited solace to our newly found friends in Central and Eastern Europe.

9. The U.S. contribution to the Immediate Reaction Force consists of the Airborne Task Force stationed in Vicenza, Italy. For background on the Alliance's new rapid reaction formations see the authors' *Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems*, SSI Special Report, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

10. The example of the commitment of VII (U.S.) Corps to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM is an example of the degree of force that might be required.

11. Even in an era of reduced threat, the Central Region remains NATO's heartland. At the same time, it appears unlikely that permission could be obtained to station forces on the flanks, as these nations have been reluctant to permit stationing of foreign forces on their soil in the past and are not likely to change in the near future. For example, Norway has long prohibited the stationing of foreign forces in Norway during times of peace. Bruce George, ed., *Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990*, 2nd ed., Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1989, p. 125. For an example of Turkish hesitation see Nilufer Yalcin, "A Federal System Cannot Be Established in Turkey," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), January 22, 1992, p. 10 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-92-020*, January 30, 1992. Even if such permission could be obtained, moving costs would likely be prohibitive.

12. Additionally, the United States may participate with the Federal Republic in contributing a brigade each to the Belgian-led multinational corps. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin C. Powell, speaks of only two divisions being stationed in Europe. Therefore, it is likely that one of these divisions will have the additional mission of supporting the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; or, another unit would have to be made available from CONUS. For Powell's remarks see, General Colin C. Powell, "Let's Not Break the Force," *Defense* 92, April/May 1992, pp. 16-17. Given the flexibility inherent in assigning units to the corps support structure, final totals of personnel could vary considerably, depending upon the number and type of units assigned. Historically, however, theater and corps support activities have accounted for roughly one-half to two-thirds of the strength of the U.S. Army's presence in Europe. Therefore, at a limit of 92,500 U.S. Army personnel in Europe, approximately 50-60 thousand would be absorbed at echelons above division.

13. For example, while risks are greatly reduced relative to the past, some residual risks could prove formidable given anticipated force structures. Moreover, warning times may not be as long as many perceive and strategic lift may not be able to meet the demands of the moment. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the on-going civil war in Yugoslavia offer only two of several pertinent examples.

14. See note 11, above.

15. The dispatch of the VII (U.S.) Corps from Europe to Saudi Arabia in support of OPERATION DESERT STORM is an excellent example of what may come to pass.

16. On the other hand, should sufficient fast sea lift be procured, such augmentation could come from CONUS.

17. For brief description of contingency forces, see *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, pp. 23-24.

18. Logistical support operations, particularly, the trans-shipment of supplies from CONUS through Europe to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM carried out by USEUCOM are an excellent example.

19. See, Angus Watt, "The Hand of Friendship: The Military Contacts Programme," *NATO Review*, Volume 40, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 19-22.

20. See, *AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B, Final Draft, June 13, 1991.

21. Note that this is a significant decrease in the previous envisaged wartime size of the *Bundeswehr* which was 1,300,000. See, DPA (Hamburg), February 19, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-034*, February 20, 1992,

p. 9. For a description of the new force structure of the German Army see, Erhard Drews, *et al.*, "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption und Elemente der Heerestruktur 5," *Truppenpraxis* (4), 1991, pp. 356-367.

22. Such a capability is contingent upon procuring requisite levels of strategic air and sea lift to support such reinforcement.

23. For example, units withdrawn from Europe such as the 8th Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Division, as well as smaller organizations, have been eliminated from the overall force structure. In an era when fiscal constraints may see further reductions in the end strength of the U.S. Army, any further withdrawals from Europe will also likely be eliminated.

24. It must be pointed out that such a debate over the "requisite" size of the U.S. physical presence is nothing new. Such discussions have taken place throughout the history of the Alliance; e.g., what level of troops constituted a credible "trip wire" for Massive Retaliation; or, what level of forces provided a credible pledge of U.S. support under the doctrine of Flexible Response.

25. Although on a scale much smaller than could be anticipated in Europe, the experience with Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and Central America provides an excellent example of such operations.

26. This figure is a function of one brigade deployed, one brigade recently returned, and one brigade preparing to deploy.

27. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General John Galvin raised this issue in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 24, 1992. See William Matthews, "Galvin: U.S. Military Would 'Lose Control' of Faster Withdrawal," *Army Times*, April 13, 1992, pp. 27, 30.

28. See, *The New York Times*, October 20, 1991. For a critical view of this proposal see Michael Inacker's article in *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt* (Bonn), October 25, 1991. Note that the French government in February 1992 assured the Bonn government that this corps would fall under NATO command and control in the event of a NATO member being attacked, while, for out-of-area campaigns, it would fall under WEU command. Whether this has clarified the issue of the WEU's future military relationship with NATO, or only made it more complicated, remains to be seen. See, *Defense News* (Washington, DC), March 2, 1992, p. 2.

29. It is instructive to note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has already indicated a need to review the number and scope of missions currently assigned to the U.S. military. See Neil Munro, "Powell: Military Must Cut Missions," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), April 6, 1992, p. 3.

30. U.S. Army, Japan offers an excellent example, albeit on a reduced scale, of such augmentation.

31. For instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William Taft VI, asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO infrastructure funds be used to support the maintenance of some U.S. facilities in Europe. Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Holst has publicly supported this proposal. See, *Defense News* (Washington, DC), February 17, 1992, p. 3.

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